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The EU-China economic relationship is 
transitioning to a new era. Years of soaring 
Chinese investments in Europe are 
increasingly met with unease by EU 
leaders. Beijing’s influence on the activities 
of its global economic actors resulted in 
economic security concerns about critical 
infrastructure and national security on the 
continent. A hectic debate about Chinese 
technology companies and a new EU 
regulation on a common investment 
screening regime are evidence of an 
ongoing policy response to perceived 
growing risks from economic 
interdependence.  
Europe is right to acknowledge these risks. 
But Europe is also alarmingly divided. 
Lacking common priorities for action 
makes individual policies vulnerable and 
insufficient. A new EU strategy on China 
must start at home. Of course, Member 
States’ political expediency is the Union’s 
eternal handicap. But this policy brief offers 
three lines of action in which policy reform 
can support Europe’s resilience and 
reinforce the foundation of an EU strategy 
on China: (1) Follow the money; (2) invest 
in substance; and (3) step up in your 
neighbourhood. 
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THE RISE OF ECONOMIC SECURITY 
Although 2018 saw Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) from China in Europe fall by as much as 
70% compared to the previous record year, 
Chinese investment stakes in Europe remained 
resilient. More than €17 billion of pending 
transactions at the beginning of 2019 
substantiate this trend.1  A robust domestic 
R&D environment, advanced high-tech 
industries, and abundant industrial know-how 
for key technologies made Germany, France, 
Italy, and the UK the leading recipients of 
Chinese FDI in the 21st century.2  
But the connection to China’s 2015 industrial 
strategy Made in China 2025 (MIC2025) is 
conspicuous. For instance: one study found 
that between 2014 and 2017, 64% of Chinese 
corporate investments above a 10% stake in 
German companies were in sectors prioritised 
by MIC2025.3 Investments are also 
predominantly geared towards take-overs of 
companies, which allows for easier acquisition 
of the relevant know-how. Since 2014, more 
than 90% of Chinese investments in the EU 
have been acquisitions, another report finds.4  
Additionally, in 2017 68% of investments were 
undertaken by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
whose connection to the Communist Party 
(CCP) is often inextricable.  
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 Alarm bells are ringing. The close link between 
the Chinese state and Chinese commercial 
actors is seen with mistrust by European 
officials, worrying about insufficient coping 
instruments of Europe’s market economies. 
Economic security concerns about critical 
infrastructure and national security have been 
rising in this context. The 2017 US National 
Security Strategy expresses this concept in a 
most ostensive manner: “economic security is 
national security.”5  The lines between what is 
considered protection and what protectionism 
are blurring – also in Europe.6 
 
‘Pour l’amour de Dieu, ne laissons pas les 
querelles de pêcheurs dégénérer en querelles de 
nations‘, the Duc de Choiseul, Minister to Louis 
XV, pled to the Board of Trade in 1763, 
concerned about securitisation of commercial 
fishing.7  In some way, the fishermen of the 
18th century are today’s advanced technology 
producers and national champions, which are 
increasingly aligned with the national interest or 
even national security.8 French Finance 
Minister Bruno Le Maire warned of the dangers 
of ‘looted’ French assets,9 while former Italian 
trade minister Carlo Calenda warned Europe 
not to ‘unilaterally disarm’ against China.10  
National security considerations, not economic 
efficiency, are increasingly challenging the 
previous balance between the norms. As a 
result, the list of national security and critical 
infrastructure discussions in Europe is 
growing.11 
 
The EU-China economic partnership is caught 
amid the growing saliency of economic security. 
But not without good reason. Economic 
exchange can generate asymmetries in which 
power relations dominate. Economic 
interdependence simply is not power neutral. It 
invites states to exert political or strategic 
influence through asymmetrical networks.12 
Europe is right to acknowledge these risks. 
Policy reform aimed at strengthening resilience 
against these risks is key for a balanced EU-
China partnership and demand prioritisation.  
 
A FIRST RESPONSE 
A policy response has been ongoing. The most 
important one among them has been the 
adoption or reform of  national investment 
screening regimes in Member States. These 
regulations are an expression of  the rise of  the 
economic security norm. When states use 
interdependence for strategic ends, other states 
are likely to start considering them in strategic 
terms too.13  Take Germany: Faced with a wave 
of  Chinese investments, Berlin reformed the 
national FDI screening regime twice within only 
18 months, responding directly to attempted 
take-overs of  critical infrastructure. Germany 
now also considers the media industry to be 
critical infrastructure, for instance. 
At the EU level, legislation to this end was 
formally adopted this month. The regulation 
allows taking a closer look at foreign 
investments in cases concerning critical 
infrastructure and cutting-edge technology.14  
Member States remain sovereign in their 
decision to intervene or not but are required to 
inform the Commission, which may issue 
advisory opinions if  it considers potential 
security or public order concerns.  
The regulation exemplifies the thin line between 
protection and protectionism. Free-market 
purists fear that the vague definitional scope of  
‘national security’ and ‘public order’ in the 
agreed text will invite unfair discrimination of  
Chinese or foreign investors based on political 
mantras. Protectionism in disguise. The security 
community meanwhile laments the horse 
blinders mentality of  commercial actors. 
Commission advisory opinions, they assert, may 
simply not be enough to offset the potential 
risks of  China’s steep economic engagement.15 
 
European governments too were split on the 
policy. Two camps of  Member States, with 
changing positions between them (such as Italy 
which opposed the EU regulation under its new 
government), eventually agreed on the 
framework. Given initially strong differences, 
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 Other measures are necessary to work towards 
a sustainable long-term balance in the economic 
relationship. For instance, a watershed 
document of the German manufacturing 
industries’ association (BDI) in early 2019 urged 
policy-makers to increase the resilience to 
threats posed by China’s state-dominated 
economy. The group proposed a policy reform 
package but also warned German companies to 
diversify their export markets away from China 
due to “excessive dependence.” 17  This is 
significant, as it indicates that also the business 
community is concerned about economic 
security risks posed by China.  
Beyond calls for reciprocity in the EU-China 
relationship lies the necessity to field a strategy 
which acknowledges that European cohesion is 
a prerequisite for action. Individual Member 
States’ political expediency chips away at the 
comprehensiveness of a common policy 
focusing on substance. A state visit by German 
Finance Minister Scholz in Beijing mid-January 
2019, in which he concluded market access and 
cooperation agreements for German financial 
and insurance industries, highlighted this 
problematic dynamic: there seems to be no 
coordinated position among Member States and 
institutions which sets priorities and requires 
coordination among all actors when engaging 
with China. 
The 16+1 framework18 – or, as some prefer to 
call it, the 1+16, to highlight the power balance 
more appropriately – illustrates the other side 
of  this dilemma. Beijing’s economic 
relationship with the 16 is dauntingly 
asymmetrical. Next to economic considerations, 
including a link to the lucrative Belt & Road 
Initiative (BRI), the platform serves as foreign 
policy tool and an avenue for influence. 
Economic interdependence is simply not power 
neutral. 
the regulation was a legislative success and 
marks an important instrument towards closing 
the gaps of  asymmetrical interdependence. But 
the lowest-common-denominator approach is 
vulnerable. To balance the EU-China economic 
partnership for the next decade, a new EU 
strategy on China is indispensable: a strategy 
which reinforces the foundation of  EU 
coherence and which addresses the gaps 
through which it can be undermined. In short, 
it must go beyond repeated calls for reciprocity. 
 
ONE EUROPE, MANY STRATEGIES? 
To be sure, different contours of  an EU 
strategy on China exist: the 2016 Joint 
Communication on ‘Elements for a new EU 
strategy on China’, followed by a 2017 Council 
Conclusion, the 2018 European Parliament 
‘Resolution on the state of  EU-China relations’, 
and, to some degree, the 2018 ‘EU Connectivity 
strategy’ represent the state-of-the-art. All are 
heavy on the economic side of  the relationship. 
 
‘Reciprocity’ and a ‘level-playing field’ is the 
most important jargon across these documents. 
In simple terms, they call for improved market 
access for European companies in China (e.g. in 
restricted sectors such as public procurement, 
digital services, telecommunications, financial 
services). They also call for China to stop 
discriminatory practices (e.g. non-transparent 
subsidy regimes, tech transfers, administrative 
procedures). 
 
The negotiation of  a bilateral investment treaty, 
the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on 
Investment (CAI), is one of  the primary policy 
instruments to achieve these goals. Started in 
2012, sluggish negotiations are still ongoing. 
The differences to bridge are wide. Upon 
conclusion, the CAI is hoped to achieve its 
goals of  improving market access and to 
regulate the nature of  SOEs.  But it requires to 
go beyond any existing approaches taken by the 
EU (e.g. EU-Vietnam trade agreement). 
European leaders should not put all their hopes 
on a sweeping success of  the CAI. 
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 Beijing has already gained political capital for 
comparatively little economic investment 
among many of  its members.  At the same time, 
several of  the 16 also have political interest, for 
instance to use the platform as a bargaining 
chip vis-à-vis Brussels.20 
This is not true for all members. Initially 
widespread euphoria about the 16+1 by now 
diluted into different camps, with some EU 
Member States such as Poland having grown 
more sceptical of  the framework’s benefits and 
about its risks.21  Others, such as Orban’s 
Hungarian government and the Czech Republic 
under President Zeman, remain hopeful for 
major political and economic gains. Non-EU 
Member States, with large financing needs, 
remain largely positive towards the platform.22 
The strategic dimension of the 16+1 thus goes 
both ways: The asymmetric interdependence of 
the relationship makes the platform a foreign 
policy tool for China. Beijing may for instance 
use the format as a bargaining chip vis-à-vis the 
EU, offering less intensive 16+1 engagement in 
return for political support on other portfolios 
(China is suspected to have tried this strategy).23 
At the same time, some 16+1 members, both 
EU and non-EU, may use their participation in 
the platform as bargaining chip vis-à-vis 
Brussels. 
EU Members have many different interests 
towards Beijing, both commercial and political. 
This is no news per se, it remains the Union’s 
Achilles heel especially in its Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP). Asymmetrical 
interdependence may expose these cleavages 
and exploit them. For every country China 
wants to influence, there is also always a 
country which plays along. We can hardly blame 
China for leveraging these gaps. But the EU 
must focus on closing them. Policies must be 
designed to compete with third powers in those 
key nodes in which asymmetrical 
interdependence may invite foreign influence – 
both inside and outside the Union borders.  
 
THE WAY FORWARD 
1.Follow the Money 
First, the EU must direct its economic activity to 
strategically important locations.  
Europe’s strategically important locations are 
those economic nodes where third states can 
leverage their interdependencies, both inside 
and outside the Union borders. This does not 
mean that the EU should strive to emulate a 
state-capitalist system in disregard of  market-
based rationales for investments. Yet, equally, 
EU economic instruments must be made fit for 
a new Geoeconomic era in which states 
increasingly leverage economic instruments for 
strategic advantages. The EU must find its own 
path, of  course: defending its liberal market 
economic model, while providing strategic 
incentives and frameworks which work to its 
benefit. 
The immediate EU neighbourhood, especially 
the accession countries in the Western Balkan, 
represents an essential pillar in the Union’s 
resilience against outside influence which may 
undermine coherence. This is to some degree 
recognised in the EU Connectivity Strategy. But 
it also constitutes a fundamental building block 
for a new EU strategy on China. If we want to 
be a credible actor with our partners, we must 
close the gaps in our immediate neighbourhood. 
This link must be explicit in an EU strategy on 
China.  
In the Western Balkans the EU is competing for 
its regulatory and political influence in the 
region. Finance offers the broadest avenue for 
influence in the infrastructure project 
development cycle. Without the protection of 
EU regulatory standards through a strong legal 
frame, the Union must first and foremost 
convince local partners of committing to 
uphold sustainable regulatory standards for 
instance when tendering for large infrastructure 
projects.  
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 A tedious task, as local authorities often only 
submit to standards à la carte and the EU lacks 
strong conditional strings in its accession 
relationship.24 
Partners and the purse are important for 
competition in the region. The multilateral 
European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) could act as a pillar for 
economic cooperation through which Chinese 
and local investment standards ideally align 
with EU and global regulatory standards. The 
EU is already the biggest donor to the bank, 
providing grants through various external 
investment instruments.25  The EU’s capital 
contribution to the EBRD should be more 
narrowly streamlined with other investment 
instruments, including the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) and national lenders. 
The Commission acknowledged this 
importance: the proposal for a new external 
investment architecture under the next EU 
budget (the Multiannual Financial Framework 
(MFF)), with simplified, more streamline 
external instruments and overall more financial 
firepower (30% increase) could be a significant 
step. An investment framework for external 
action of  up to €60bln was also tabled. It is up 
to the national governments to act on these 
proposals in the MFF negotiations. 
Within EU borders, the 2014 Investment Plan 
for Europe (IPE), with as its primary pillar the 
European Fund for Strategic Investments 
(EFSI), could also be more closely streamlined 
by linking it to the EU Connectivity strategy for 
instance. This could act as an important bridge 
between internal and external investment flows 
and pre-empt deepening asymmetric 
interdependencies at the borders of the Union 
Mobilising private capital is of  course key for 
EU investment instruments. By reduing the 
risks for private investors, the Union’s 
instruments can unlock big multiplier on their 
investment. For quantitative reasons alone, 
private capital is necessary.  
But that does not mean the debate about 
sovereign investment instruments should be 
buried. Quite the opposite. Recent experiences 
in safeguarding the Iran Nuclear Deal 
(JCPOA)26 and the subsequent development of  
a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) demonstrate 
the importance of  investment flexibility for 
strategic purposes which may only be 
guaranteed by sovereign instruments. Debating 
such emergency measure instruments in 
anticipation of  similar events is necessary. 
Similarly, a Domestic Investment Facility could 
step in when EU strategic sectors (critical 
infrastructure) are at risk of  take-over and no 
private investor can be found. The take-over of  
German robotics firm KUKA by the Chinese 
Midea Group in 2016 re-opened this debate. In 
2018, German state bank KfW successfully 
fended of  a Chinese take-over of  50Hertz, a 
high-voltage network operator. Germany’s new 
industrial strategy 2030, released this month, 
calls for the introduction of  such policy 
instruments.27 This is a legitimate debate and 
must be discussed at the European level – and 
not only at the level of  economic efficiency.  
Additionally, the financial firepower as well as 
the lending mandate of  the EIB could be re-
negotiated by Member States. 2018 already saw 
a strategic turn for the EIB lending mandate in 
response to the US re-imposition of  its 
sanctions regime on Iran. In all too familiar EU 
ad hocery, Iran became eligible to receive EIB 
financing. The bank’s commercial activities were 
streamlined with the Union’s strategic interests: 
to safeguard the JCPOA. Anticipation of  similar 
events is indispensable. Streamlining the EIB 
mandate more closely with the Connectivity 
Strategy for instance could allow for more 
flexibility in the future. 
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   The looming Brexit may open the necessary 
space to address these questions. The EIB has 
already moved into Member States’ diplomatic 
cross-hairs. Capital increases, compensating the 
UK’s share, as well as governance reform are 
under discussion. Diplomats should remember 
the lessons learned with regards to the possible 
role of  the bank in supporting strategic goals. 
 
2. Invest in substance 
Second, the EU must invest in sectoral dialogues with 
relevant substantive collaboration.  
 
There exists a myriad of  more than 80 dialogue 
formats between the two – from research & 
innovation, competition policy, trade, business, 
energy, customs, maritime, and tourism, to 
name but a few which were identified in last 
year’s 20th EU-China Summit Joint 
Statement.28 As both parties like to affirm, the 
strategic partnership is comprehensive.  
 
And yet comprehensiveness does not 
necessarily give indication on the importance of  
individual formats. High-level summits are 
important. But substantive collaboration at the 
technical level is even more crucial. High-level 
summits are the body of  the car body, which 
cannot drive without its engine: substantive 
collaboration.  
 
Not all formats of  cooperation are equally 
important. Priorities must be defined and given 
prominence. The EU’s priorities lie in those 
formats addressing the avenues for influence.  
Infrastructure development represents such an 
avenue.29 The 2015 EU-China Connectivity 
Platform is an important tool aimed to create 
synergies between transport infrastructure 
development policies of  the two partners, 
namely the Trans-European Transport 
Network (TEN-T) framework and the BRI. But 
the success of  the platform has been limited. 
Only three meetings so far30  and somewhat 
dissatisfied EU officials stand in contrast to its 
ambitious agenda a few years ago. 
 
Yet the platform’s significance remains high. 
The EU should spend political capital to 
increase its substantial scope (energy, digital) 
and bind other partners such as the US and 
Japan into the platform. This is already a goal 
of  the Connectivity Strategy, but should be a 
priority action point in the EU-China economic 
partnership.  
 
3. Step up in your neighbourhood 
Lastly, the EU must step up in its neighbourhood and 
make a difference where it is expected to do so.  
 
It is not only about money. This has become 
painfully obvious in the Western Balkans. 
Despite the EU accounting for 75% of  FDI in 
Serbia for instance, public support for 
membership dropped from over 70% in 2003 to 
less than 30% in 2017.  Unfortunately, a 
growing trend in the region. Meanwhile, 
Chinese and Russian recognition has been 
soaring in the region in past years, despite 
comparatively little economic investments. 
 
A positive communication agenda is an 
important instrument to support economic 
efforts. The EU is not least competing with 
China’s development approach. BRI projects 
are skilfully announced across Chinese-
influenced media outlets and are well 
coordinated with the political platform of  the 
16+1.  The notion of  huayuquan (话语权) – to 
speak with authority, guide debate, and set the 
parameters of  acceptable discourse – has 
become an important discursive tool. Beijing’s 
has mastered public diplomacy through 
different channels.32  
 
With new players in the region, the EU must 
rethink its engagement. Above all, EU leaders 
must realise that they are competing for 
influence in a region previously regarded as a 
largely exclusive EU playground, which could 
be managed only by its accession instruments. 
This strategy has been proven insufficient. 
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 A new, convincing narrative on all levels: 
national and local government and civil society 
is necessary. Above all, a credible path to 
accession must be clearly outlined. Technical 
aspects of accession are important. But without 
full political commitment, Europe is 
undermining its influence. 
 
Bottom-up approaches are equally important. 
The EEAS has set up, a ‘Stratcom Western-
Balkans Task Force’ in 2017, promoting fact-
based narratives about the EU. While the main 
tasks of Stratcom focus on dispelling myths, 
disinformation, and propaganda, a positive 
narrative on economic development is equally 
important in building resilience. 
 
The EU’s principles of connectivity, as defined 
in the Connectivity Strategy, are contested by 
China’s economic role in the region. A more 
vigorous bottom-up diffusion of these EU 
principles could be approached by linking up 
the Connectivity Strategy with the Stratcom 
Western-Balkans Task Force. This could allow 
for a more concerted effort by local EU 
delegations, national embassies, and the 
Stratcom Task Force to implement the 
Connectivity Strategy and remain competitive. 
 
Partnerships, both private and public, are key 
for increasing local engagement in projects and 
gain multiplier effect on public diplomacy 
efforts. The US, Japan, and others have put 
forward their own connectivity strategies. It is 
mandatory for the EU to link up their partners 
efforts as quickly as possible.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The EU is in the middle of  a Great Power struggle: 
towards the West, US pressure on Europe to de-
couple from Chinese interdependence is 
mounting; towards the East, Beijing’s deep and 
asymmetrical economic engagement caught the 
EU on the wrong foot and put it in a defensive 
position in defining the content of  the economic 
partnership. How Europe will be able to position 
itself  between the unfolding Great Power 
competition may be its greatest challenge in the 
coming decade. 
 
But diplomatic mastery alone will not suffice. To 
remain the desired stabilising force between the 
two powers, the Union must strengthen its 
foundations and field a coordinated strategy 
towards them. Without swift action, European 
states risk becoming chess pieces the Great 
Powers.  
  
There is a window of  opportunity with China: the 
strategic rivalry with the US, a tumbling Chinese 
economy, and domestic political contestation 
pushes the CCP to the European table. Will the 
Europeans agree on what they want and where 
they want to go? A strong, unified strategy on 
China is a policy choice taken in European 
capitals, not in Beijing. 
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